

CULTURE & DEVELOPMENT 20 YEARS AFTER THE FALL OF COMMUNISM IN EUROPE

Background Paper to the Conference

Cracow, 4th - 6th June 2009

ANALYSIS OF STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

Subject Areas	Discussion Gains and Strengths	Discussion Losses and Weaknesses
1. The position and status of culture	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. On the eastern half of Europe, in the majority of countries it is still a living (albeit historical) memory that culture played a vital role in national revival, in making of a nation in the modern sense, or in re-gaining sovereignty. This legacy lends culture a different standing than in the west. Treating the protection and development of culture as a common public cause, a responsibility of public authorities (especially the state), is accepted naturally and generally.2. Under communism culture served for mental resistance and civic pride, emblematic actors of the regime change included many cultural personalities, which contributed to the prestige of culture.3. Culture has lately been increasingly recognised also as a factor of development and welfare, and this has corroborated its political status.	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. The traditional prestige enjoyed by culture is mostly manifested in symbolic (rhetoric) ways only and is seldom reflected in the political and budgetary priorities.2. When national or local communities set major strategic tasks, these rarely relate to culture. Culture is rarely considered to be a strategic field, a change agent; often the contrary: a medium against change, an ornament losing its reflective power. Recreation, tranquility and satisfaction are sooner associated to it than tension, excitement or hard-earned success. Culture has not been seriously involved in tackling the global economic crisis (other than worrying about its effect on the sector).

<p>2. Values, characteristics and orientation of culture</p>	<p>4. There are kinds of cultural values that enjoy particularly high respect in the eyes of east-European societies. This applies to national heritage, especially in traditional art forms (literature, music, theatre, painting, sculptures, folklore etc.). Often language is considered to be the eminent cement of the nation. This esteem of culture stems from old historical determinations but in many ways was reinforced by the communist decades, too. In the communist ideology culture played a prominent role, which position was kept till the end - at least at the level of lip service. In the last phase of communism this was further strengthened by nationalist cultural revival in many places.</p> <p>5. In the 90s particular interest was expressed towards counter-cultural phenomena in the former regime and towards personalities in exile or prohibited during the communist era.</p> <p>6. Successful efforts have been taken to adapt cultural products to contemporary taste, to the trends of societies of 'spectacle' where the focus is on image and event production, and to bring desirable images and couch them in spectacular settings.</p> <p>7. New values and tastes appear manifested in many contemporary art forms, interdisciplinary projects and festival formats. Overcoming the former isolation, the often forcefully provincial value hierarchies, the local canons can now be set against global cultural references.</p>	<p>3. Cultural values are predominantly conservative. This is largely true about the general public and various funders, too. Policy priorities reflect this state by the strong emphasis on national heritage (including myths of limited authenticity), reinforcement of unified canons and identities, and by preferring traditional (classical) mainstream genres and works.</p> <p>4. Outstanding achievements of 20th c. avant-garde and modernism in east Europe are little capitalised on.</p> <p>5. Contemporary, innovative genres have harder life here than in the rest of Europe. Support received from western donors often makes these genres treated and rejected as alien and being threats to national culture.</p> <p>6. Notwithstanding the basic introvert nature of culture policies, orientations have, after the regime change, turned towards the west. (Such a degree of unipolar orientation last prevailed a hundred years earlier.) Interest towards the closer neighbourhood of nations has weakened. Few effective inter-regional connections have emerged or have been re-created so far.</p>
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<p>3. Cultural behaviour, and attempts to change habits</p>	<p>8. European integration, globalisation and technological advances have opened up new and wide avenues towards the works of universal culture. The cultural behaviour of the people in east Europe has grown closer to western patterns. Already the early signs of economic and social consolidation allowed for large groups of people to appropriate culture habits that earlier had, for a number of reasons, been beyond reach for them. The latest cultural trends and products (films, media programmes, books etc.) of world production can be accessed practically without the delays and bans customary in previous historical periods.</p> <p>9. The young have been particularly quick to acquire new cultural behaviour and consumption patterns. Their cultural tastes and habits are getting close to – and sometimes fully coincide with – those of the same cohorts in western Europe, or the entire world, for that matter, which is a potential for co-operation, progress and innovation in culture.</p> <p>10. Cultural behaviour patterns are to a great extent product of school education. Curricula include subjects like literature, arts, sometimes cinema, and the network of specialised art classes or parallel music schools is quite widespread (and deserves protection).</p>	<p>7. As censorship and top down patronising control of the cultural offer disappeared, and with the quick development of the entertainment businesses, the cultural consumption patterns changed dramatically, allowing more for commercially provided mass products.</p> <p>8. Cultural institutions and programmes exert limited attraction because they very slowly adjust themselves most of them neglect marketing work and audience development adapted to the new patterns of cultural behaviour.</p> <p>9. People watch television longer than the European average. Media regulations, or their lacunas, allow for imported and domestic low-budget productions, often in pirate manner. Satellite broadcasting, even when it includes commercial television channels, has made limited impact (except in times of political crises or wars).</p> <p>10. The school systems offer very few initiatives that shape cultural habits of the young with good efficiency and at a considerably wide scale.</p> <p>11. The generation gap in tastes and habits appears to be wider than in the west, owing to the larger part of youth following converging global culture patterns, which happens to a much smaller scale among the senior age groups.</p> <p>12. The culture of the new rich, typically lavish and vulgar, has acquired great influence, through advertising and glossy magazines, on the less prosperous layers of society.</p>
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<p>4. Cultural inclusion, tackling mass cultural poverty</p>	<p>11. Advance of technology has broadened the possibilities of cultural consumption and participation also for the poorest groups in society.</p> <p>12. Programmes of culture for social change, introduced and implemented mainly as an initiative of international donors and partners were enriching experience for local cultural institutions that on some occasions have been continued.</p>	<p>13. With the collapse of low effective industry and agriculture, large segments of society lost the relative security that communism provided (especially employment). In a number of countries masses of Roma population share this fate.</p> <p>14. Extensive depression areas came about. The unemployed, the elderly, inhabitants in disadvantaged geographic surroundings etc. are large groups of losers of transition who got – or have remained – outside of the scope of culture as conventionally defined. Culture institutions have largely failed to tackle the problems of the culturally most deprived groups. There is no evidence about major successful targeted outreach programmes and audience development projects.</p> <p>15. Particularly desperate are the cultural prospects in the areas that were devastated by enforced or spontaneous ethnic cleansing, accelerated migration and turning into social ghettos.</p>
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<p>5. The role and impact of folkloric tradition</p>	<p>13. The processes of nation building attributed inherent identity values to the people (<i>das Volk</i>), especially to the peasantry. Study, care and respect of traditional peasant culture is therefore a typical component of nation building and reinforcement of patriotic attitudes. Pieces of peasant folklore are generally considered to be pure and authentic manifestations of the soul of the nation (and increasingly of regions, too) and serve for inspiration for contemporary creators as well. Folkloric motives and impacts are applied by modern artists in search of distinction and originality, and not just as payment of tribute.</p> <p>14. Traces of classic folklore are easier to identify and reproduce than in western Europe. There are geographic and social pockets with traditional (mainly rural) communities that still practice considerable amount of folkloric culture: economic activities, habits, instruments, clothes and artforms.</p> <p>15. Based partly on traditional rural folklore and on modern popular entertaining, urban folklore is lively and in most places (especially in the Balkans) is increasing its popularity. It has important cohesive and identity function even when more entertaining and commercial than artistic..</p>	<p>16. Folklore is all too often superficially identified with the purest essence of the nation. Many of its artistic adaptations and commercialisation are deceptive and fake. The double motivation of national ideology and tourism interests usually exert distorting effects on the manifestations of both surviving folklore and its contemporary uses.</p> <p>17. Public authorities are inclined to support folkloric arts that exploit clichés of questionable authenticity, which diverts funding from the more creative projects that apply folklore motives in contemporary contexts.</p>
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<p>6. Culture in rural communities</p>	<p>16. The spectacular advances of telecommunication offer unprecedented access to information and culture in more and more remote areas. Libraries have benefited from these opportunities, many of them are on the way to become multifunctional community and cultural centres. Owing to these developments, much of the traditional handicap in rural living conditions, which was also manifested in cultural demands, offer and habits, has decreased.</p> <p>17. Culture has reinforced its role of local cohesion, identity and pride, a vehicle of self-celebration in rural communities.</p> <p>18. As cities are moving in the direction of post-industrial economy, villages are exploring the possibilities of post-agricultural future, where, at least in some cases, culture would play a key role (artistic residences, rural museums, open air festivals etc.) The rediscovery of the values of rural environment both for permanent settling and for the occasional tourist visitor, has in the later years gathered considerable momentum which enhanced increased care for the environment and appreciation for local identity and heritage.</p>	<p>18. Cultural activities in villages and small towns encountered a number of challenges after the regime change. The former structures of agriculture, including the <i>kolkhoz</i> type of collective production largely disappeared, and private farming offers stability for a shrinking minority only. Organised group visits to the cultural institutions in the regional centres, to fairs and other events or larger cities – typical of the communist era – have discontinued.</p> <p>19. Smaller settlements have lost many (often all) of their public institutions – especially cultural – and many of the young inhabitants. Public transport is rapidly dwindling. Motivation for a fuller life declines.</p> <p>20. Telecommunication multiplies exposure to national and global culture but prevents the development of local culture. With the spread of means of technology – especially television – the demand for traditional joint leisure activities have decreased, consuming culture became a home pastime. Where local stimuli are scarce, only remote control culture prevails. Opportunities for out-of-home culture are usually poorer than before the regime change.</p>
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<p>7. Old and new forms of cultural diversity</p>	<p>19. After (or to prevent) cataclysms of co-habiting cultures, tolerance and respect have become the official policies. Rampant discrimination and the policy of cultural assimilation (widespread in the late national-communist era) ceased to prevail, subjugated cultures got recognised or re-discovered, taboos got weaker. The cultural rights of minorities have been enacted and respected – although this shows great variations among the 24 countries.</p> <p>20. Most of the formerly monopolistic associations of minorities – structures inherited from the previous regime – survived, but the actual scene is more characterised by a multiplicity of civil society forms.</p> <p>21. International players have been particularly active in promoting intercultural cooperation.</p> <p>22. There are a number of good examples to prove that culture can help bridge differences even in the area of the most challenging ethnic tensions. The flowering of Roma art (especially in music) has acted as a catalytic factor towards majority societies.</p>	<p>21. Although many of the 24 countries represent heterogeneous cultural mosaics, public authorities tend to put the main emphasis on the dominant culture and do not typically see the cultures of minority ethnic groups as part of the cultural richness of the place. Ethnocentrism is widespread. Both the majorities and minorities perceive each other as threats. Even in peaceful zones, these phenomena persist in more or less latent forms.</p> <p>22. Due to the official policies or on their own initiative, minorities are often confined into folkloristic ghettos or curio reservoirs as distinct from the dominant culture, on their own initiative. As a result, mono-cultural projects prevail, also in the cultural minority support policies. This practice sometimes stresses the dividing lines between ethnic communities, especially in the cities. The idea of intercultural dialogue, interaction between cultures and even their hybridisation, which forms the base of contemporary intercultural approach, has little influence on the political agenda.</p>
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<p>8. What governments, regions and cities spend on culture</p>	<p>23. After the hardest early years of economic and social transformation, the percentage of cultural spending in the central state budgets regained the share that they had had before. The mechanisms of public support for culture have become more flexible and diverse. Along with direct subsidies given to public institutions, the governments have developed various grant schemes from which independent cultural operations can benefit, too. In addition to the current subsidy covering routine expenses of an organisation, grants for experimental programmes and projects are available also in the public sector.</p> <p>24. As a result of devolution, the accumulated spending of municipalities (and in some cases of the regions) is becoming the decisive amount in public support for culture. Since the total sum of local spending grew quicker than the purchase value of the often diminishing central cultural budgets, the overall balance of the twenty years of public cultural spending has been slightly improving.</p>	<p>23. The culture sector is excessively dependent on the public authorities as regards management and public support. Disproportional share of subsidies goes on the running of institutions, and within this on payrolls. Public budgets on every level are rarely used to support the independent cultural organisations and initiatives belonging to the third sector.</p> <p>24. The lower GDPs of these 24 countries have an impact on culture also in the public sphere. The disposable share of community budgets to spend on culture rarely matches what cities or regions can afford in richer countries in the west, in terms of urban regeneration, cultural sites or events. The emerging economic crisis threatens with heavy reductions.</p> <p>25. The subsidy side gets the main attention: all parties concerned tend to treat the income or revenue side as an unpleasant toll only.</p> <p>26. The mechanism of public-private partnerships in funding projects has not been developed enough to provide diverse multi-source funding in the cultural field.</p>
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<p>9. What citizens spend on culture</p>	<p>25. The difficult and critical early transition period was characterised by sharp declines in spending on culture. With relative consolidation, several groups of the population have become able to spend regularly on culture. This is reflected by the increase of the sales and consumption statistics of various cultural goods and services.</p> <p>26. The new, or the reinforced old middle class represents a considerable demand and purchase power for cultural manifestations that earlier only western societies could afford: concert tours, expensive exhibitions etc.</p> <p>27. The groups of millionaires and billionaires constitute a new type of customers and consumers of culture, which has contributed to the strengthening (or birth) of a few exquisite segments of cultural trade: auction houses, top level art galleries etc.</p> <p>28. Inhabitants of other parts of the world also spend on our culture: in the frames of tourism, and in paying for exported products and services of culture.</p>	<p>27. The lower GDPs have an impact on culture with regard to individual spending, too. In spite of cheaper local goods and services, their cost expressed in e.g. minutes of salaried work, usually reflects the handicap of the eastern citizen in accessing to internationally acknowledged products – books, records, concerts, films, exhibitions, festivals etc. This relative misery was the hardest at the early transition period when certain cultural fields were particularly disfavoured by historical turbulences, and because people spent much of their disposable money on the formerly forbidden cultural products, suddenly flooding the markets.</p> <p>28. The limits of the local culture markets represent serious constraints for cultural operations where the box office revenue is a considerable factor of existence or development.</p> <p>29. The strategy of expanding cultural markets through culture tourism development is hampered by poor infrastructure, lack of co-operation among the stakeholders, and the frequent reluctance of cultural institutions to make their offer more appropriate for the tourist market.</p>
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<p>10. What businesses and charities spend on culture</p>	<p>29. Under communism artificial forms of 'business sponsorship' prevailed: state companies and co-operatives were obliged to run libraries, houses of culture etc, and to 'patronise' culture in other ways. The regime change opened up ways for modern forms of business sponsorship. Cultural organisations adapted to this by developing fundraising skills and an ability to approach businesses and foundations and motivate them to support cultural activities or projects. A number of companies and banks have also adopted western know-how in the field of sponsorship: corporations have established foundations, grants, transparent priorities and criteria. Lately the social dimension of business support has increased.</p> <p>30. Support from private resources has grown to be a vital source in certain segments of culture. From the late 1990s several countries have produced laws that define the various forms and are meant to induce both business support and acts of philanthropy to good causes, including culture. Although boundaries between various legal forms of private support are often blurred, this causes little hindrance.</p> <p>31. The scale of donations from private individuals continues to expand, reaching instances of extraordinary spending by the rich, some of these of considerable importance for the advancement of the best values of culture.</p>	<p>30. Sponsorship and charity, including 'corporate social responsibility', is of low level, due to lack of traditions, to poor fundraising skills in culture organisations, and to the absence of enlightened managers, but above all to the limited number of financially powerful and autonomous businesses, including banks and corporate funds or foundations.</p> <p>31. Significant partnership is realised mainly between big corporations and big national cultural institutions. It is less common between the small and medium-size cultural and business organisations, especially in the provinces.</p> <p>32. Instead of indirectly facilitating the relationships between business and cultural organisations, the authorities often play a proactive role, directly matching partners from the two sectors. As a result, business supports cultural organisations not because it expects advantages from the sponsorship deal but with the main aim to demonstrate its loyalty to the political power.</p>
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<p>11. Civil society and culture</p>	<p>32. The third sector sprung up as if from zero and has become a decisive component of the cultural life. In a number of areas civic initiatives, including entrepreneurial ones, changed the scarcity of the former period into a surplus of offer overnight: books, performances, records (illegal though in a great part) etc. Some of these operations gradually grew from civic to second sector business phenomena.</p> <p>33. The old formal and monopolistic artistic unions have either transformed into democratic associations or were replaced by new professional networks and organisations. These act as vehicles of professional communication, promotion of best practice and facilitation of innovation and change.</p> <p>34. The emerging alternative art spaces and groups have been important sources of creativity and channels of innovative ideas. They are particularly important at international co-operation and exchanges.</p> <p>35. Lately an even looser kind of independent self-organised practice has entered the scene. Heavily reliant on personal networks and nodes of information and migration, these practices (sometimes labeled as fourth sector) have become a central force in the shaping of cultural activity, increasingly recognised even in the media.</p> <p>36. Volunteering under communism was voluntary mostly in name only, and lacked the autonomous will of citizens: this practice has gone through the necessary transformation from a command society to democratic environment and true volunteering has begun to catch up in numbers.</p>	<p>33. The legacy of the communist period is particularly hard in this respect: the handicap in civil society activeness is a soring reality. The absence of living traditions curbs the demand for, and the experience in transforming civic needs into action. Community and neighbourhood activities lack the established frames of a free democracy. Volunteering in the western sense had to start from zero and it still lacks the necessary social prestige and acknowledgement, as well as the experiences and the administrative framework.</p> <p>34. Instead of being perceived as partners to the government, complementing the work of the traditional institutions, exploring new grounds and even acting as the public policy agencies, third sector cultural organisations are too often considered as rivals and troublemakers. It is not often that they can collaborate with the state-subsidised organisations.</p> <p>35. In the absence of stable mechanisms for supporting newly emerging independent networks and third sector organisations from public budgets, these operate with no or low budget. Lack of sustainability is a crucial problem.</p> <p>36. A common problem for cultural NGOs is lack of appropriate office space (and space for workshops, exhibitions, rehearsals, performances, etc.), as they are rarely able to pay a commercial rent. For this reason, many cultural NGOs lead homeless or nomadic life.</p> <p>37. Cultural NGOs often lack skills necessary to handle the managerial, financial and legal problems; they are often unable to survive organisational crises.</p> <p>38. With the gradual increase of commissioning or other form of involvement of third sector agencies by the state, they have begun to lose the critical stance towards state and market.</p> <p>39. The democratic deficit is particularly felt as the weak civic control over the processes of defining and implementing culture policies. Culture professionals rarely express their interests in effective, organised ways.</p>
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<p>12. Main features of public policy-making in culture</p>	<p>37. Regime change brought about an active search for new models of culture policies, including new techniques and procedures. This search ranged from the negation of culture policies to revival of pre-war, pre-communism patterns, but above all an eager study of western examples. The liberal policies of anglo-saxon countries had the greatest impact. Some elements of those were adapted or at least served as main point of orientation in the east of Europe.</p> <p>38. At first, public policies were predominantly focused on the traditional public institutions (museums, theatres, libraries, etc.), which were perceived both as the end and the means of the cultural policy of the administration. Later, the scope of policies has expanded to include the independent sector – embracing both not-for-profit and commercial cultural organisations – where government sought to support activities going in line with its priorities. At the same time, reform of public institutions was started aiming at their conversion into more independent entities, thus making the public sector more open to the demands of the public and to networking with other organisations.</p> <p>39. Parallel to culture keeping its position in the political credos, the youthful independent scene developed its own bottom-up cultural policies. This often challenged, sometimes complemented the official cultural policies. Forward looking culture policies in the region owe much to the ideas born and cultivated by these alternative ateliers. The Council of Europe, the chain of Soros foundations, and culture diplomacy institutions of some western countries played an important role in advocating progressive culture policies.</p>	<p>40. The reformist wave of the early years was followed by a gradual regression to routines. Protecting the status quo became stronger than innovation. The main focus of culture policies is on institutions and buildings that are maintained by regular subsidies usually assigned on the basis of established patterns and vested interests. The absence of search for new solutions is concealed by an overproduction of regulatory materials and “strategies”. Culture budgets are rarely based on evaluating prior programmes or setting clear (new) objectives and criteria.</p> <p>41. Inertia goes hand in hand with limited competence, which works against the effectiveness of public cultural policies – in a world when increasing diversification diminishes the influence of public cultural policies anyway. There are few successful instances of joint policy actions with other sectors. On the whole, rare are the examples where conscious culture policy measures exert lasting, strategic impact on any area or aspect of culture (or life). Culture policies are usually reactive; in worse cases even non-responding.</p> <p>42. There is still an invisible wall separating the traditional, state-supported institutions and the independent sector, although there are no legal obstacles any more for equal treatment and collaboration.</p> <p>43. The shift towards local (regional and city) levels is not accompanied by the same shift of attention to local strategy making and planning. Devolution is often a form of getting rid of central or national responsibilities.</p> <p>44. Public policy-making is little transparent. In fact, the professional and lay public rarely insists on more openness and citizen interaction. There are few substantial debates on cultural issues. Neither are they discussed or questioned in the media.</p>
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<p>13. Inherent and external goals for culture policies</p>	<p>40. With the regime change culture lost its ideological chains and cultural actors have acquired more freedom to pursue intrinsic values. There is no constraint to fill culture policies with economic and societal duties and planning targets at various (national, regional and local) levels.</p> <p>41. At the same time, a new notion of the instrumental value of culture is becoming recognised, especially on the local level. The new rhetoric of the impact of culture on the investment climate, image of a place, urban regeneration, prevention of social conflicts, etc, is entering the political discourse. The growing attention to creative industries has accelerated these processes. Culture has lately become valued not only for its own sake but also as means to achieving this broader set of goals.</p>	<p>45. The traditional, static image of culture works against the search for new objectives and priorities, and for re-defined justification of public resources for culture. This, combined with the fear of ideological loading that was discredited during communism, results in general, vague definitions of culture policy goals, and thus produces policies with limited effect.</p> <p>46. No rhetoric has been developed to advocate culture except the necessity to 'rescue' or 'save from oblivion' its inherent 'spiritual values'. Few disputes go beyond these arguments to stress and articulate the role of culture in meeting current social or economic challenges. Doing culture is justified by itself as good for the nation and the community. As a result, culture is perceived rather as a 'sacred cow' consuming some part of the taxpayers' money which appears more of a decent toll than as investing in a sector where useful work is being done.</p> <p>47. When there are definite culture policy objectives, these are rarely defined in specific and clear targets. The use of indicators, benchmarks, monitoring and accounting are little spread and developed.</p> <p>48. The impact, the lasting effect of culture policies is rarely evaluated. The absence of objectives or result oriented targets reinforces the homeostatic nature of culture policies, their main effort being the maintenance of achieved structures.</p>
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<p>14. The social functions of culture</p>	<p>42. The age of the enlightenment strengthened the social function of culture, emphasised the plebeian aspect at the expense of the aristocratic. Educating and raising the lower classes was an important component of the 19th century nation-building in these countries, too. It took various forms, from providing access to cultural works (especially standard pieces of national and global canon) for the poor, to offering opportunities of participating in culture, in the frames of special public institutions to etc. By necessity of the still detectable (and partly re-emerging) backwardness, the historic mission of culture towards progress prevails in the east to a greater extent than in western Europe. This is still reflected by the significant share of socio-cultural programmes and institutions in the various culture budgets, especially at the local levels. The democratisation of culture continues to be an active agenda all over the region.</p> <p>43. The networks of 'houses of culture' (or cultural centres) were created eminently for related purposes. Although they collected the stigma of communist propaganda stations, in most countries the existing infrastructure and professional staff has been kept and transformed into new, democratic forms.</p> <p>44. The ethos of caring for the culture of the community and the self is gaining momentum in the middle classes, surviving the fake egalitarianism and collectivism of the former decades.</p>	<p>49. The dichotomy of aristocratic and plebeian culture policies has lately lost much of its relevance, partly transforming into high and low; similarly to avant-garde and classical turning into innovative and mainstream; with strong convergence and hybridisation in the postmodern age. These processes are less advanced than in the west, and therefore in the east the distances between the cutting edge avant-garde elite and the average mass are larger.</p> <p>50. The middle class remained (or became) passive in the first phase of regime change, also in its cultural aspirations.</p> <p>51. The paradigmatic change from the top-down democratisation of culture to cultural democracy – that is from access to the promotion of autonomous participation and empowerment – has affected eastern culture policies only superficially. Indeed, it is nowhere the dominant factor of the social aspect of culture policies.</p> <p>52. The traditional cultural democratisation, too, lost most of its momentum during the difficult transition period. The actual social strategy component of the culture policies in the east European societies and communities in most cases are unconvincing conglomerates of concepts like inclusion, cohesion or equality. (Differently from the historical antecedents of 19th and early 20th c. modernising efforts, as well as from the communist 'cultural revolution', whose goals were more focused.)</p> <p>53. Pseudo-classical or fake-folkloric forms of the amateur art as cultivated in the communist times have not transformed into the full-fledged contemporary version of community art activities.</p>
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<p>15. The contribution of culture to the economy</p>	<p>45. A few genres had a short lived bonanza immediately after the regime change. Newly established, often semi-legal publishers and booksellers had good sales of formerly inaccessible and hastily produced publications all over eastern Europe. Such activities contributed to the first million of quite a few entrepreneurs.</p> <p>46. Today culture represents a non-negligible share among the branches of the economies of these countries. Worth for singling out is what cultural tourism, computer games, digital animation, film production, sales of books and records etc. add to gross national / domestic product. Recognition of the potential of culture for the economy results in redefining cultural policies, carrying out systematic mapping, and devising synergies with other sectors.</p> <p>47. Due to the prestige of culture, the majority of the cultural infrastructure was saved from the initial stages of ‘wild market’ privatisation. Their buildings, spaces and collections are an asset also in economic terms, and a resource to rely upon in the course of development of the new policies.</p>	<p>54. The prevailing conservative elitism (that was reinforced in the old regime by the Stalinist anti-market dogmas) separates culture from the economy in most minds. At the earlier stages of transformation, debates on ‘commercialisation’ versus ‘preservation of true spiritual values’ distorted the perception of the input of culture to the economic development.</p> <p>55. Where the interaction of culture and economy got, however, acknowledged, slogans have rarely been translated into practical strategies that would aim at a win-win relationship.</p> <p>56. The overall balance of commercial cultural exchange with the rest of the world remains negative: east European countries consume considerably more than what they export, whether in the conventional way of cross border customs traffic or in other forms of generating national revenue (e.g. touring).</p> <p>57. The widespread adoption of ‘creative sector’, ‘culture industries’ and related terms into the culture policy rhetoric has only rarely resulted into relevant analysis or complex treatment of culture industries. Culture, as well as creative industries, is rarely mentioned in the discussions on the development of the post-industrial innovative economy, unlike scientific and hi-tech research or financial services that receive a great deal of attention from policy-makers (and the media).</p> <p>58. The few creative clusters that have emerged in some places remain, in the majority of cases, private initiatives that have little to do with either economic or cultural agenda of the urban development policies.</p>
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<p>16. The role of culture in regional, urban and environmental development</p>	<p>48. The irresponsible attitude and miserable resources vis-a-vis the environment and the look of towns and villages – typical of the previous regime – was replaced by policies that acknowledged these values and goals. Owing to the devolution of political administration and of command over development resources to regions and towns, the relative share spent on such kinds of investment has kept growing. Investments have focused on the most exposed city centres and sites. Growing amounts of funding were directed towards the protection of built and natural heritage. The first complex programmes of post-industrial revitalisation appeared. In some places urban development allowed for the construction of valuable architectural landmarks, involving a few architects of world fame.</p> <p>49. Specific cultural investments include the construction of new flagship institutions or the modernisation of old ones: concert halls, museums, houses of culture etc.</p> <p>50. Following the post-industrial trends, creative quarters or clusters consisting of independent culture businesses and organisations have been established in a number of former factories and other derelict industrial buildings. In addition to their cultural impact, these clusters have potentials for creating economic value added.</p> <p>51. Travel restrictions having lifted, the mobility of people added to the desire to raise the appeal of practically every city and region. Besides built environment, products like exhibitions, festivals etc. were developed. The few European Cultural Months, and later European Capitals of Culture have been important catalysts of such investments.</p> <p>52. Public resources were complemented by private investment and in some cases by western aid. In case of member states, a few cultural infrastructure projects have enjoyed considerable sums from the European Union.</p>	<p>59. The greater part of the region is off the beaten paths of global tourism. Therefore investing into urban regeneration with the aim of drawing more visitors can be less promising than in western Europe.</p> <p>60. In the attempts to use culture for urban regeneration, the role of the independent creative sector is usually underestimated and resources are directed mainly to the improvement of the traditional infrastructure (museums, libraries, theatres, concert halls, etc.).</p> <p>61. The construction of cultural buildings – whether small culture houses or big flagship investments – is rarely followed up by proper cultural programming. After inauguration, inappropriate resources serve the cultural activities. Sometimes even basic maintenance of the building is neglected.</p> <p>62. Aspiration for new landmarks often runs into putting up prestige buildings from public funds, with little care about functionality, expenses etc. This is especially typical of the easternmost fringe of the continent, where civic control is weaker against investments that mirror political power, and which are supposed to express sovereignty and identity, often in a ‘classical’ tradition.</p>
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<p>17. Shaping the image of the nation, branding the city</p>	<p>53. In the past twenty years, the greater part of the national, regional and local communities have lived with the freedom to demonstrate sovereignty and identity, later economic consolidation. Cultural investments, seasons and festivals celebrate the newly regained independence and autonomy (or contribute to newly carved identity and self-assurance).</p> <p>54. In the former regime, there were a few appointed leaders who could achieve cultural strength and individuality for their cities. Decentralisation, the restitution of local autonomy has opened the chances for such endeavours for all cities. The past few years have demonstrated accelerated efforts for the expression of local pride, through urban development, creating landmarks (often in the form of cultural infrastructure), capitalising on built and spiritual heritage, launching new festivals etc. Towns are becoming neat and attractive, and their individual features are increasingly emphasised. It is acknowledged that a country (region, city) is valued for its brand and market worth. Places increasingly want to be closely identified with a cultural feature (genre, event, product, personality etc). Some of these developments and initiatives have been integrated into the local cultural tissue and gained far-reaching fame.</p> <p>55. The desire for recognition has also upgraded features of contemporary culture that promise international fame and visibility.</p>	<p>63. Branding the place (nation, region or city) has an excessive proportion in culture policies, at the expense of serving the citizens of their own. Culture diplomacy efforts: organising seasons and maintenance of infrastructure often have questionable cost-impact efficiency in terms of both promoting the place or the advancement of culture.</p> <p>64. Also ‘at home’, cultural offer for visitors is typically isolated from local life. Instead of developing vibrant local culture, placing effort on contemporary, innovative genres, image making concentrates on the past – and often on imagined, artificial recollections.</p> <p>65. Focusing on past glory and indigenous cultural achievement usually lack skills and self-recognition, and thus rarely has the required impact. Symptoms of colonial attitudes have sprung up, cultivating folkloric façade, fake bucolic milieu, and false myth management in efforts to fascinate.</p> <p>66. Efforts to highlight present and past values of a place are usually selective, little generous towards non-dominant or past cultural components.</p> <p>67. Flagship culture projects considered as emblematic for branding, are politicians’ favourites, and often divert excessives resources needed for the development of cultural infrastructure, better programming of existing institutions and support of creative initiatives.</p>
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<p>18. The place of culture in the job market</p>	<p>56. In the former system practically everyone was employed by the state. Even individual artists were linked to the state through the membership of the monopolistic professional unions. Like the entire workforce, the numbers of culture workers were also centrally planned, regulated by the enrolment figures of education. Cultural institutions were admittedly over-staffed, nevertheless many of these professionals were equipped with valuable knowledge acquired through high level education (where most people remained intact of the communist agitprop stuff). The human capital embodied in these people is still an asset.</p> <p>57. After the turn, the sharp decreases in the numbers of public employees were gradually counterbalanced by the growing numbers of people in the culture sector in a diverse scale of statuses that range from self-employed to employees in non-profit and private (and privatised, e.g. publishing) business sectors; part-time employment is on the increase. A growing number of people take the risk of pursuing artistic occupations beyond levels that was not conceivable within the frames of strict employment planning. With the advancement of technologies, large numbers of new type jobs came about connected to culture industries. Taken these factors all together, the share of culture-related occupations has reached and surpassed the pre 1989-levels.</p>	<p>68. The position of culture in the area of employment still reflects a conservative structure. Too many people are employed in too few, mostly public institutions. Since, on the other hand, the numbers of independent, self employed culture professionals, or of people that occupy part time or other flexible jobs, have grown slowly, the overall contingent of workers in or for culture remains below the European average.</p> <p>69. The ambivalent legal, fiscal (and social) status of independent professionals restrains the growth of the creative sector.</p> <p>70. Conceptual and methodological uncertainties and other shortcomings of the statistical apparatuses prevent from getting reliable figures about those working in the independent sector, let alone in the creative economy.</p> <p>71. The advances of the global cultural offer undercut domestic industries, especially in film and music, sharply reducing the employment opportunities there.</p> <p>72. Innovative ways of employing culture professionals – e.g. in extracurricular school activities – are little explored.</p>
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<p>19. Governance in culture</p>	<p>58. As the control of the communist party, manifested partly through state administration, disappeared, culture institutions and organisations have enjoyed greater level of autonomy and freedom.</p> <p>59. Several new forms of institution appeared, some of them combining public and private, non-profit and business features, offering opportunity for corporate (collective) leadership and control.</p> <p>60. The principle of arm's length governance was greeted from the outset and has been applied in a number of forms, especially in the mechanisms of distributing public grants. The Soros foundations, established across the region, had an important role by demonstrating the model of distributing grants on the basis of clear criteria, involving experts.</p> <p>61. There have been successful examples of involving stakeholders in culture policy decisions and implementation, either ad hoc or in more institutionalised forms.</p>	<p>73. Outdated governance models depending on the whims of bureaucrats and formal leaders of cultural institutions prevail. This results in poor strategic planning and lack of consistency in policies pursued on every level. Exemplary practices of corporate governance are rare, formal (fake), or simply non-existent. The majority of the few arm's length funding agencies are also inefficient. Structures of professional autonomy of culture operations are often parodies of accountable self-government. Where autonomy exists, it often takes the form of unaccountable, feudalistic autonomies, instead of offering managerial and programme security to cultural operators.</p> <p>74. As the other side of the coin, culture operators demonstrated limited trust towards the authorities at almost every level, including the institutions of the European Union – this was especially sensed in the early phases.</p> <p>75. The scarcity of efficient, stable or innovative governing structures of culture organisations is, however, not a broadly recognised, claimed and discussed deficit on behalf of the professionals or the public.</p>
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<p>20. Cultural management</p>	<p>62. The absence of management skills that are needed for adapting to new market conditions soon began to be addressed. By now, the training programmes of formal and non-formal education and training are on a par with those in the west. Also, where eastern cultural projects interact with their western equivalents (touring, travelling exhibitions, co-ordinated releases of films, books etc) the necessary professionalism has been achieved and prevails.</p> <p>63. New standards prevail at most of the cultural spaces, including friendly attitude towards customers, open and welcoming atmosphere, variety of programmes offered for different audiences, flexibility of opening times, well-designed web sites, shops selling cultural items, cafes and bars, as well as other services and facilities providing for the overall comfort and diversity of cultural experience.</p> <p>64. Some managers of third sector organisations have demonstrated more innovative and flexible managerial approach than their western colleagues where stable funding and predictable future is secured.</p>	<p>76. The general level of management is still far from satisfactory. Gap and tensions exist between old and new managers' generations. Average skills and performances in marketing, communication, audience development and fund-raising are inferior to practices in the old democracies.</p> <p>77. Organisational structures are not reformed to make the operation of cultural organisations more efficient. The majority operate as traditional, hierarchic organisations.</p> <p>78. Systematic evaluation of the efficiency of public cultural organisations and the assessment of tasks of the employees very seldom takes place.</p> <p>79. Cultural institutions are slow in changing habits and style in dealing with their customers. The staff is often arrogant, even hostile, towards the visitors; opening hours are inconvenient for the public; programmes are not diverse enough to meet the needs of different audiences; basic facilities, such as cafe or shop in a museum, may be absent, etc. The traditional cultural institutions often cannot compete with the independent organisations, especially for the younger audience. They are reluctant to address their visitors using up-to-date style, language and means of communication; prefer monologue over dialogue; and fail to provide conditions and comfort that have become standard in other public places.</p> <p>80. A trained cultural manager seldom feels at home in a traditionally structured cultural institution. Many of them, especially the young ones, migrate to the third sector, or to the creative industries, or get involved in the temporary independent projects, such as festivals, exhibitions, etc. instead of contributing to the improvement of the public sector.</p>
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<p>21. Education and career of culture professionals</p>	<p>65. The previous regime offered relative security, and – for the most privileged culture professionals – tangible public benefits like recreation holidays, pensions, procurement of artistic products etc: in some countries considerable elements of that protecting web have survived and still function.</p> <p>66. Later, induced to a large extent by initiatives in the west (including UNESCO), new pieces of legal guarantees have been created with the aim of greater security and specific treatment for various categories of artists.</p> <p>67. Art education was one of the priorities in the communist era. Much of the network has survived, and this area produced some early instances of transformation into private businesses. Top institutions have been involved in the global exchanges of talent and creativity.</p> <p>68. A new type of 'portfolio career' has developed in the cultural sector. Instead of moving up the steps of hierarchical structure, many artists and arts managers are now moving 'horizontally', from one project to another, acquiring experience, skills and reputation reflected in their portfolio.</p>	<p>81. The specifics that exist in many cultural occupations – early retirement of dancers, wide-spread self-employment etc. – are insufficiently reflected in legislation. Social security systems leave important groups without sufficient level of protection.</p> <p>82. Basic level art education continues to lose grounds as local governments place their priorities elsewhere. Government policies also rarely highlight this field.</p> <p>83. The artist colonies which exist in the field of visual arts cannot replace a more systemic approach which is needed not only for visual artists but also for artists working in other fields. There are few publicly supported art residencies in the modern sense of the word (most of the <i>dachas</i> of artists associations have been closed).</p>
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<p>22. Mobility in culture</p>	<p>69. The administrative obstacles prevailing in the communist period have disappeared, travel and communication facilities have developed, language competencies have widely improved, professional contacts in all sectors have strengthened between west and east, which resulted in large scale cross-border mobility of culture professionals, without being criminalised as being illegal defectors of their countries. The increased level of mobility brought about the transfer of know-how for all sort of culture operators, including administrators and managers.</p> <p>70. Access to richer markets has been an opportunity to make a living, get perfection or add eastern flavour to productions for a great number of cultural actors, especially musicians. Many eastern artists have made it to the top of the global hierarchies.</p> <p>71. Mobility is present on another dimension as well – some cultural operators change their jobs from the civil sector to public cultural institutions or to public authorities; some others establish their own enterprises; even some persons from business field move to non-profit cultural sector.</p> <p>72. Overcoming the leanest transition period, more and more opportunities for artistic residencies have opened in the 24 countries, the majority of them engaged in trans-border mobility, too.</p> <p>73. The east-east dimension of mobility has lately also reached a level that is near normalcy, partly thanks to western countries, operations and projects, including the European Commission.</p>	<p>84. Visa and employment restrictions harshly curtail the mobility of culture operators in the majority of these countries.</p> <p>85. Mobility has – in spite of old and new obstacles – been mainly taking place with its focus on the developed west. In a few areas this has produced brain drain symptoms: the most talented culture actors leave their home country for good.</p> <p>86. Besides physical mobility (moving house), modern technology allows for hidden virtual brain drain, too: more and more cultural workers work for distant employers, mainly multinationals, from home.</p> <p>87. At the same time inter-regional connections, co-operation and movement have weakened or disappeared.</p> <p>88. Citizens of the easternmost countries are largely excluded from the main flows of cultural co-operation and exchange. They become increasingly isolated, which gives rise to greater ethnocentrism.</p>
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